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Successive economic reforms starting in 1979 have radically trans-formed China over the past 30 years. China’s economy has emergedas the world’s second largest after that of the United States and is
set to take the top spot in the long run. Over these 30 years, China’s de-
velopment policies have changed in three phases. After spending the first
half of this period pursuing a so-called “opening” (kaifang) policy centred
on modernisation of production and technology transfers, China adopted
a “socialist market economy” from 1992 with the focus on profitability
and diversification of enterprises. This new policy gave rise to a system
greatly resembling capitalism. Even before its entry into the World Trade
Organisation in December 2001, China was encouraging foreign invest-
ment. Its development currently focuses on exporting manufactured prod-
ucts, benefiting from relocations by foreign firms investing in China, and
from the price advantage China enjoys thanks to its undervalued currency.
This article examines the consequences of this series of policies on the
workforce.
Demographic transition
In the 1970s China entered the second phase of its demographic transi-
tion, characterised by declining birth and fertility rates. Birth control meas-
ures adopted from 1972 onwards helped reduce the birth rate from 33.6
per 1,000 women of childbearing age in 1970 to 17.27 per 1,000 in 1979,
and the fertility rate from four to 2.5 children per woman. This trend was
briefly interrupted during what is regarded as the “third baby boom” of the
1980s when, despite the adoption in 1979 of a radical one-child policy
that failed to find favour with the people, the birth rate rose to 23 per
1,000 in 1987, with the fertility rate declining only slightly to 2.2 children
per woman in 1990. In fact, the authorities had anticipated this rise, having
conceived of the one-child policy precisely in anticipation of the coming-
of-age of a multitude of young women born during the second baby boom
of the 1960s. Simultaneous reductions in the birth and fertility rates re-
sumed in the early 1990s following a renewed emphasis on the one-child
policy and reinforced by a contraction in the number of young women
coming of age, i.e., women born in the 1970s. The birth rate had fallen to
14 per 1,000 by 2000, with the fertility rate dropping to between 1.7 and
1.8 children per woman. The birth rate continued to decrease gradually in
the 2000-2010 decade. It is now about 12 per 1,000, with the fertility rate
appearing to hover around the same level. 
This change has had several consequences. First of all, it has led to a
modification in the age structure that has translated into a contraction in
the proportion of young people under 15 years of age. Their proportion fell
from 33.4 percent in 1982 to 24.3 percent in 2005. At the same time, the
15-to-64 age group, often counted as the potentially active working pop-
ulation, grew by 300 million, from 624 million (61.9 percent) in 1982 to
927 million (71 percent) in 2005, representing an annual average growth
of 13 million over the 23-year period. The 15-64 bracket will continue to
grow at a gradual rate and reach a plateau at about a billion individuals by
2015 or so. That would account for 72.5 percent of the projected total
population of 1.38 billion, following a sustained annual increase of 11.5
million for 33 consecutive years. As for those older than 65, their number
more than doubled in 23 years, from 49.3 million (4.9 percent) in 1982 to
100.5 million (7.5 percent) in 2005, and they are expected to account for
about a quarter of the population between 2030 and 2040.
Workforce statistics
It should be stressed at the outset that in contrast to population figures
for the last three decades, which can be reconstituted with considerable
precision on the basis of investigation and census data, there are large di-
vergences between employment figures from the censuses and those cited
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in annual official statistics. The first of these divergences is that census re-
ports register the working population by place of residence and also in-
clude, for example, farmers living in municipal areas among the figures for
the urban workforce. They then divide the workforce into two categories
according to branch and type of work, but take no account of the legal sta-
tus of the jobs. The annual statistical reports, in contrast, attach primacy
to recording the legal status of jobs. Thus the reports list under “urban”
workforce all those in public service, including a not insignificant number
(officials and workers on state farms) stationed in the countryside. And
they do not directly register farmers who returned to their family holdings
following the dissolution of People’s Communes after 1979, who thus ap-
pear implicitly after subtracting from the total rural workforce the employ-
ees of rural enterprises and the remainder of the non-farm private sector,
and reintegrating the fraction of agricultural workers falling under the
“urban” workforce category noted above. A second divergence concerns
the total workforce. The annual reports during the 1980s showed work-
force numbers notably lower than those from the censuses, and even
though the two totals did coincide for a few years following the publica-
tion in 1993 of the 1990 census figures, the annual totals were higher than
those in the census from the early 2000s. The third divergence concerns
the major sectoral categories. In the overall accounts of these categories,
the annual reports systematically underestimate the proportion of the pri-
mary sector, while overestimating that of the secondary and tertiary sec-
tors. All these divergences will be borne in mind in the remainder of this
article.
Changes in the 1980s
During the 1980s, the age structure was characterised by a very large dif-
ference between the sizes of the expanding and declining generations. The
former included all those born between 1964 and 1974, numbering around
25 million individuals, while the declining generations covered all the Chi-
nese turning 60 between 1980 and 1989, not more than 7 million individ-
uals. It therefore became apparent that at least 16 million jobs needed to
be created annually just to maintain an employment rate of 90 percent.
Further, to the extent that, as in the Maoist era, workers’ mobility between
the countryside and cities remained highly constrained, the cities and the
countryside constituted relatively autonomous zones, and in such condi-
tions it would be preferable to look separately at the demographic situa-
tion in urban and rural areas.
To return to the 1982 census, cities and towns accounted for less than a
fifth of the total population, and it may be deduced that the average size
of the expanding urban generations would have oscillated around 4 million
individuals, (1) with the declining generations numbering no more than 1.2
million. To the extent that the state guaranteed full employment, it was
necessary to create at least 2.5 million jobs annually to cope with the de-
mographic situation, while also accommodating the millions of young
people returning from the countryside after the end of the Cultural Revo-
lution, (2) and the one million or so rural youth authorised to settle in cities
every year. A total of 4 or 5 million jobs had to be created annually just to
maintain full employment in urban areas. 
The expanding generations in rural areas numbered some 20 million
young people, replacing declining generations that were a mere 5 million
strong. The situation was in fact a lot more difficult to fathom because, just
as during the People’s Commune era, the state was content with promot-
ing the formation of rural enterprises, at first as part of cooperatives. As for
farm labour, it was now entirely up to rural households to allocate tasks
among their members to fit the needs of their small holdings. (3)
In 1980, going by the annual statistical report, the active urban work-
force of 105 million made up 24 percent of the nation’s total workforce
and enjoyed a privileged position. In fact, apart from some 800,000 private
workers (holdovers from what was still a sizeable sector in the 1950s), they
were exclusively employed in the public sector (80.19 million) and urban
collectives (24.25 million), which secured them several advantages encap-
sulated in the popular expression “Iron Rice Bowl.” Given jobs after com-
pleting secondary or higher education, these wage earners (zhigong) spent
their entire careers in the same branch of activity, even the same enter-
prise, which also defined their social environment. Employees of public or
collective enterprises in urban areas enjoyed virtually free housing as well
as health coverage. Women above 50 or 55 and men over 60 were entitled
to a pension paid by their work unit equivalent to a high proportion of
their salary. Their children were accorded priority access to jobs in their
parents’ work units or in a corresponding unit. The biggest enterprises ran
schools and hospitals, and their managers had additional responsibility for
family planning, all of which represented a heavy burden for the firms and
their management. 
For the sake of convenience, we will examine the decade in two equal
periods separated by the urban reforms of 1985. 
During the first period (1980-1984), the urban workforce rose by 17.2
million, with 6.2 million in the public sector and 7.9 million in the urban
collective sector. (4) To this must be added 3 million private sector workers
as well as those with the new status of employees of joint ventures be-
tween Chinese firms and foreign companies, generally located in the Spe-
cial Economic Zones along the eastern and southern coast.
The creation of more than 17 million jobs over five years in the urban
public and collective sectors imposed a very heavy burden on these enter-
prises, which as noted earlier also had to extend numerous benefits to their
employees. Recruitment policies were modified starting with the urban re-
forms of 1985, following which some 20 million new employees taken on
in the years 1985-1989 were only accorded the title of “contract workers”
with no immediate access to the basket of benefits under the “Iron Rice
Bowl” system. Further, in order to lighten the burden represented by the
construction and upkeep of housing, former workers were given the option
of acquiring their homes on very favourable terms. Moreover, the govern-
ment encouraged private sector development and the growth of new job
outlets such as joint ventures or foreign direct investment by Hong Kong
and Taiwan businesses. Their employee numbers rose by a total of 2.8 mil-
lion in five years, from 5 million to 7.8 million. Nevertheless, in 1990, ac-
cording to the 1991 statistical report, the urban workforce was made up
almost exclusively of public and collective enterprise employees. However,
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1. Urban populations had experienced a decline in fertility rates right from the 1960s, well before the
launch of policies to restrict births.
2. The 1982 census noted 3.4 million “people awaiting employment,” most of them young people under
25.
3. The great majority of farmers were subject to the so-called “household responsibility” system. They
had the right only to use the land allocated to them according to household size and the number of
potential workers. Their status was akin to that of tenant farmers: they had to hand over a portion of
their production to the state at fixed prices but kept the surplus. Only a minority of “specialised house-
holds” enjoyed greater economic autonomy.
4. This situation was the result of a rebalancing in favour of the urban collective sector, which gained
nearly 5 million workers in 1984, while the state sector shrank that same year by more than half a mil-
lion, reverting to its 1982 level (86.3 million). 
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while the private sector was still weak, it had already gained visibility and
begun to modify the urban physiognomy. (5)
Rural workforce 1980 to 1990
As for the countryside, rural enterprises saw massive expansion, the num-
ber of employees growing within one decade from 30 million to 92 million
in 1990. To this should be added 16 million of the self-employed mainly
engaged in trade. These new jobs would have accounted for 78 million
people, more than three-fourths of the total growth (89 million, according
to the annual reports), far short of the needs suggested by demographic
parameters. 
Workforce changes as reflected in the 1982 and
1990 censuses
The changes reflected in the annual statistical reports and in the 1982
and 1990 census data diverged considerably on many points. Going by the
annual reports, the total workforce expanded by only 143.8 million, from
423.6 million in 1980 to 567.4 million in 1990, an annual increase of 13
million, divided into 35 million “urban” jobs and 110 million rural ones.
These totals fall far short of the needs suggested by the demographic con-
ditions. Meanwhile, the 1982 and 1990 censuses showed a total increase
of 126 million in eight years, divided into 41 million urban and 75 million
rural jobs, an annual average of 15.75 million in line with demographic pa-
rameters.
Moreover, rapid urbanisation had taken place during the eight years be-
tween the two censuses. The urban population (cities and towns) had ex-
panded by nearly half, from 206 million to 296 million, an annual growth
of 9 million, indicating a notable increase in the proportion of urbanites
from 20 percent to 26 percent of China’s population. Of course, this
growth resulted essentially from the granting of municipal status to a large
number of agglomerations (6) alongside a still limited emigration from rural
areas. In 1982, it may be noted, 27 million out of 113 million urban work-
ers were engaged in agriculture, that is, 23 percent of the urban workforce.
As per the 1990 census, out of the 166 million urban workers, 60 million
had the status of farmers and 37 million (22 percent) were engaged in
agriculture. Meanwhile, the 52 million rural non-farm workers in 1990 still
represented a mere 10.8 percent of the total, a figure and proportion much
lower than the 108.7 million, or 22.8 percent, stated in annual reports.
The 1990s
As highlighted above, the demographic situation had turned much more
favourable by the 1990s. Population growth had slowed, with the total ris-
ing from 1.14 billion in 1990 to 1.265 billion in 2000, an increase of 
125 million ( just under 11 percent in ten years). Over the same period, the
potential working population expanded by just 105 million, from 755 mil-
lion to 860 million, an average annual increase of 10.5 million. The ten ex-
panding generations born between 1975 and 1985 totalled just 198 mil-
lion, against 87 million for the generations exiting their working life. The
pressure weakened compared to the previous decade, as it now became
necessary to create just tens of millions of jobs annually. At the same time,
as during the 1980s, there was strong urban growth. The population of
cities and towns increased from 296 million to 455 million, that is, by 159
million, or more than 50 percent. Meanwhile the proportion of urbanites
in China’s population rose from 26 percent to 36 percent. As during the
previous decade, this increase resulted from both the granting of munici-
pality status to many agglomerations and a sharp influx of rural migrants,
whose movements were no longer much restricted. The 2000 census noted
change of residence by nearly 150 million people, about 50 million of
them moving to another province. However, since these rural folk retained
their “agricultural population” status, it had become possible to get an idea
of the extent of the rural exodus. Given that in 2000, cities and towns had
160 million people with “agriculture status,” while urban farmers num-
bered just 42 million, it is possible to gauge the extent of the “rural mi-
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6. The numbers rose from 244 cities and 2,660 towns in 1982 to 458 cities and 11,999 towns in 1990.
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Year Urban employment Public sector Collective sector Others Rural employment Non-agricultural Total
1980 105.2 80.2 24.2 0.8 310.2 30 423
1981 110.5 83.7 25.7 1.1 318.4 437.2
1982 114.3 86.3 26.5 1.5 326.7 453
1983 117.4 87.7 27.4 2.3 338.7 464.4
1984 122.2 86.4 32.1 3.8 359.8 482
Table 1 – Employment figures for 1980 to 1984 as per annual statistical reports (in millions)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
Year Urban employment Public sector Collective sector Others Rural employment Non-agricultural Total
1980 123.6 89.9 32.2 5 370.6 37 498.7
1985 128.1 93.3 34.2 5.4 379.9 512.8
1986 132.1 96.5 34.9 6.4 390 527.8
1987 136.1 99.8 35.3 7.5 400.7 543.3
1988 137.4 101.1 35 7.8 409.4 553.3
Table 2 – Employment figures for 1985 to 1989 (in millions)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
grant” (mingong) phenomenon. It should also be noted that the rural pop-
ulation shrank by 35 million between the two censuses. 
It is possible to distinguish between three phases in the changing eco-
nomic situation during the 1990s.
The 1991-1993 rebound
These three years have to be considered a time of recovery following the
political and social crisis of 1987-1989, which culminated in the occupa-
tion of Tiananmen Square in central Beijing in May 1989, leading to violent
repression in early June. This crisis, going back to 1987, had economic, so-
cial, and political consequences. As for the economy, the period was char-
acterised by a strong slowing down of growth (20 percent in three years)
in the context of external trade deficit and currency devaluation. On the
social level, popular dissatisfaction greeted price increases that reminded
people of the galloping inflation of the late 1940s. In the political arena,
the ruling class stood divided over popular demands for reform.
The first three years of the new decade were characterised by a return to
growth. No doubt job creation was still limited. The active working popu-
lation grew by a total of no more than 20.5 million, from 647.4 million to
668.1 million, (7) an annual growth of just under 7 million, much lower than
during the previous decade. This growth was reflected prominently in
urban areas, where 12 million jobs were created, the employment figure
rising from 170 million to 182 million. In 1993, the 143 million secure jobs
were divided between 109.2 million in the state sector (76 percent) and
33.9 million in the urban collectives (24 percent). Half of the new jobs
were contractual. At the same time, there was a rise in the number of self-
employed, who numbered 11.1 million in the private sector (6 percent)
and 6.2 million in enterprises of different kinds, including 3.5 million in for-
eign invested companies. It should also be noted that 23 million workers,
or 12.6 percent of the total, were not clearly identified. (8) The increase of
5.5 million state sector employees was compensated by the loss of 1.6
million jobs in the collective sector. The total of 143.1 million in these two
categories represented a mere 78.3 percent of urban jobs: 29 million of
them were contract workers (16 percent).
As for rural jobs, the total increased by just 4 million to 8.5 million – from
477 million to 481 million as per annual reports, but to 485.5 million ac-
cording to the 1990 census. The novel element was the rapid development
of rural enterprises and the private sector. In 1993, there were at least
123.5 million employees in rural enterprises and 22 million self-employed
or private sector workers, or 30 percent of the rural workforce.
The effect of ideological changes on employment 
As would have been expected, the years 1994-1997, following Deng Xi-
aoping’s famous southern inspection tour of 1992, were characterised by
a greater diversification in the types of enterprises and an encouragement
of soaring foreign investment, initially from Hong Kong and Taiwan and
then from developed countries as a whole. In 1997, urban jobs totalled
207.8 million, having expanded by 21.3 million in four years, an annual
growth of 5.3 million. After growing by 3.4 million between 1993 and
1995, public sector jobs shrank by 2 million, accounting for just 110.4 mil-
lion in 1997. As for the urban collective sector, it continued its slow decline
from 1992 and supported only 28.8 million people, a contraction of 4 mil-
lion in four years. The two sectors together thus employed 139.2 million
people, or just 67 percent of the urban workforce. Private sector workers
and the self-employed numbered a little over 25.4 million, or 12.2 percent
of the urban workforce. As for enterprises of various kinds, they employed
about 10 million or so, of whom 6 million worked in foreign invested firms.
It is worth noting the persistent strength of jobs not clearly labelled – 23.6
million, a figure very close to that for 1990.
Rural jobs, meanwhile, increased by a mere 2.2 million, or just 0.45 per-
cent. Non-agricultural jobs expanded slowly. The workforce of rural enter-
prises fluctuated, while the total of self-employed and those in the private
sector stood at around 41 million after an increase of 13 million in three
years. The 171 million non-farm workers represented a little over 35 per-
cent of the rural workforce. 
The 1998 crisis and its consequences
It is well known that the Asian financial crisis that gripped Southeast Asia
in 1998 also badly affected South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. But as will be
shown, it also had serious consequences in China. Urban employment grew
by just 15 million in three years, while the urban public and collective sec-
tors, deemed unprofitable, slumped and lost 43.4 million jobs, or 36 percent
of their workforce, from 1997 onward. In 2000, they employed 96 million
people, accounting for just 42 percent of the urban workforce. In other sec-
tors, employment expanded to 53.9 million, a gain of 5 million in three years.
It is noteworthy that jobs not clearly identified increased from 57 million to
81.6 million, an increase of 24.6 million. This number is very close to the fig-
ure of 26.5 million unemployed, including 11 million who lost jobs and 15
million young people awaiting their first jobs, as noted in the 2000 census.
As regards the rural workforce that had practically stagnated at the 490
million level from 1993 onward, the Asian crisis had negligible effect, with
only the non-agricultural sector contracting slightly to shed 2.4 million
jobs, while the individual or self-employed sector lost about 10 million, or
a third of the total.
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7. The 1990 census figures used by the annual statistical reports from 1994.
8. These “unidentified” workers emerged in 1990, when the total for “urban” labour had been reassessed
at about 30 million in order to reconcile with the 1990 census data. The new total of 170.4 million
was nevertheless slightly greater than the total working population in “cities” and “towns” – 166 mil-
lion, including 38 million suburban farm workers.
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Year Urban employment Public sector Collective sector Others Unidentified Rural employment Non agricole Total
1990 170.4 103.5 36.6 14.4 20 477.1 108.6 647.4
1991 174.6 106.6 36.2 7 20.3 480.3 113.4 654.9
1992 178.6 108.9 36.2 11.1 20 482.9 124.8 661.5
1993 182.6 109.2 33.9 16.3 23.2 485.5 145.1 668.1
Table 3 – Workforce changes 1990 to 1993 (in millions)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
Taking the decade as a whole, in light of data from both the annual re-
ports and the censuses of 1990 and 2000, it may be noted that the work-
force grew by just 73 million in ten years, from 647.2 million to 720 mil-
lion, or an average annual increase of 7.3 million. Meanwhile, there are
major divergences depending upon whether data from the annual reports
or the censuses are used. In the annual reports, this growth was reflected
exclusively in urban employment, which grew by 62 million, that is, from
170 million to 231.5 million, or an annual increase of 5.2 million. Mean-
while, the urban public and collective sectors, which accounted for a total
of 139 million jobs in 1990, had grown to 145 million in 1994, but slid
steeply to 96 million in 2000, shrinking by a third. This fall was in part
compensated by the development of new forms of employment, which
accounted for the addition of 45 million jobs in ten years. But the fact
that 81.6 million workers could not be properly identified was a sign of
the difficulties China confronted in emerging from the crisis. As for the
rural workforce, it grew by just a dozen or so million from the start of the
decade, but its composition was modified nevertheless with the creation
of some 60 million non-farm jobs. The proportion of non-agricultural
workers grew by 50 percent, from 22 percent to 34 percent. It is impor-
tant to note that in contrast to the experience of the 1980s, it was not
just rural enterprises that contributed to transforming the employment
structure: the strength of the private and self-employed sectors had
grown 2.6 times over the decade – from 15 million in 1990 to 39 million
in 2000. Again, as per the annual reports data, China in 1990 had 389 mil-
lion engaged in the primary sector (60.1 percent), 138 million in the sec-
ondary sector, and 118 million (18.3 percent) in the tertiary sector. In
2000, the figures were 360 million (50 percent) in the primary sector, 162
million (22.5 percent) in the secondary sector, and 198 million (27.5 per-
cent) in services. 
The 1990 and 2000 census data confirm the sharp slowdown in workforce
growth, with the total rising from 647.5 million to 720 million, (9) but they
shed a different light on the employment structure. The primary sector sta-
bilised around the 1990 figure, that is 467 million, but with a fall of 7 per-
centage points, from 72 percent to 65 percent, while the secondary and ter-
tiary sectors soared from 97 million and 92 million to 108 million and 144
million, respectively, with the services sector speedily overtaking manufac-
turing. As was already the case in the 1982 census, the 1990 urban popu-
lation included 39 million farmers (23 percent), while the active rural pop-
ulation had 60 million people (12.5 percent) working in the secondary and
tertiary sectors, and the 2000 census counted 46 million farmers. 
The 2000s
The first years of the twenty-first century have been characterised by a
sharp slowing down of demographic growth, which since 2000 has been
around six per 1,000, or between 7 million and 8 million a year. At the
same time, the potential working population has been growing by 12 mil-
lion annually. This is because of the size differential between the ten ex-
panding generations numbering 220 million individuals, and the declining
generations of close to 100 million who were being replaced. The potential
working population increased from 860 million in 2000 to 927 million in
2005, that is, an annual rise of 13.4 million. However, with young people
joining the job queue later thanks to the prolongation of their studies, (10)
and a trend towards letting more employees retire in their fifties, (11) the
authorities estimated at the start of the decade that they only needed to
create 9 million jobs annually. The other major development was burgeon-
ing urbanisation. Going by the annual reports, between 2000 and 2008 the
total workforce expanded from 720.8 million to 774.8 million, an increase
of 54 million or 6.75 million annually. Urbanisation proceeded apace. The
2000 census data and the 2005 study showed that China’s urban popula-
tion grew by 61 million, from 455 million to 516 million. In 2005, the
urban population represented 40 percent of the country’s total. As was the
case since 1990, this increase was primarily due to migration from rural
areas and the integration of a portion of farmers into the urban popula-
tion. Rural exodus was to become the main cause of this growth hence-
forth. In 2005, some 325 million urban residents, that is, 62.5 percent of
the total, retained “agricultural” status,  although farm-related jobs in
urban areas numbered no more than 77 million, a third of urban employ-
ment. Meanwhile, the rural population shed about 60 million, dropping to
744 million, or 57 percent of China’s total. 
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9. The tables on jobs in the 2000 census resulted from a study of 118 million “long questionnaires,” that
is to say, just 9.5 percent of the total population. The figures cited here are restituted basing on the
total of the annual reports for 2000, that is, 720.8 million. This figure included 26 million unemployed,
including some 15 million young people awaiting their first job offers.
10. 40 percent of young people aged 16 to 19 years were studying in 2005.
11. In 2005, of the 54 million retired people, 19 million, or 35 percent, were under 60 years old. 
Year Urban employment Public sector Collective sector Others New forms Rural employment Non-agricultural Total
1994 186.5 112.1 32.8 23.1 18.5 488 148.9 674.5
1995 190.4 112.6 31.5 29.2 17.1 490.2 163.8 680.6
1996 199.2 112.4 30.2 37.6 19 490.3 176 689.5
1997 207.8 110.4 28.8 44.9 23.6 490.4 171 698.2
Table 4 – Workforce changes 1994 to 1997 (in millions)
Source : Annual Statistical Reports
Year Urban employment Public sector Collective sector Others New forms Rural employment Non-agricultural Total
1998 216.2 90.6 19.6 49 57 490.4 171.3 706.4
1999 224.1 85.7 17.1 52.9 68.4 489.8 166.1 713.9
2000 231.5 81 15 53.9 81.6 489.3 168.9 720.8
Table 5 – Workforce changes 1998 to 2000 (in millions)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
Annual statistical reports put China’s workforce at 758.2 million in 2005,
with an addition of 37.4 million in five years, or 7.5 million annually. This
figure is contradicted by the mid-decade mini-census the same year,
which noted a lower growth of 19.6 million or 3.9 million annually, going
by the corrected figures of 694.8 million (12) and 714.4 million. In the an-
nual reports, the growth continued moderately, given that 774.8 million
employed were noted at the end of 2008, an increase of 16.6 million in
three years or 5.5 million annually. This growth was mainly reflected in
urban employment, put at 302.1 million, having expanded by 70.6 million
in 9 years, or an annual growth of 7.84 million. This was despite a contrac-
tion in the workforce of the urban public sector and collectives, which shed
25 million between 2000 and 2008, representing about 23.6 percent of
urban employed. It might appear strange that at the same time, the num-
ber of jobs in traditionally defined categories rose by just 82 million, while
those in new forms of activity rose by 81.6 million to 95.1 million. In 2008,
they would have accounted for nearly a third of the urban workforce, a sit-
uation reflecting perhaps the spectacular influx of rural migrants and
growth of the informal sector. Meanwhile, the annual reports noted just 8
or 9 million unemployed benefiting from support payments.
The situation in the countryside was simpler, given the diminishing pop-
ulation. The rural workforce lost 17 million between 2000 and 2008,
shrinking from 489 million to 472 million. At the same time, the number
of jobs created in rural enterprises and the private sector as well as the in-
dividual self-employed sector rose by 32 million to 203.6 million, meaning
that 43 percent of rural inhabitants were no longer engaged in agriculture
in 2008. 
Conclusion
Modernisation
It is clear that despite the relatively unfavourable demographic situation
that prevailed until 1990, economic reforms had helped create a little
more than 250 million jobs in 27 years, that is, more than 9 million annu-
ally. At the same time, the job structure underwent considerable moderni-
sation, with a major shrinkage of the primary sector and development of
the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
However, as shown above, the amplitude of these transformations was
reflected differently in census data and the annual reports. Going by cen-
sus figures, the farming population at first increased from 348 million to
420 million and reached 468 million in 2000, eventually shrinking to 420
million in 2005, and its proportion falling from 73.7 percent to 59 percent.
The secondary sector’s workforce expanded from 81.8 million to 125 mil-
lion, and that of the tertiary sector from 55 million to 168 million. In the
annual reports, this modernisation was much more marked as the propor-
tion of the primary sector workforce fell in 26 years from 68 percent to
39.6 percent, while those engaged in the secondary sector increased from
77 million in 1980 to 210 million in 2008, and those in the tertiary sector
from 55 million to 257 million.
A glance at the census tables on the distribution of jobs by “types of ac-
tivity” (zhiye), a classification of a sociological nature, helps better under-
stand the extent of modernisation in Chinese society (table 8). 
The 1982 census reported that political cadres made up 1.55 percent of
the total workforce; technicians or those with technical or university edu-
cation made up 5 percent; lower staff, a category made up of police offi-
cers and diverse groups of subordinate civil servants, made up 1.3 percent;
trade and service employees 3.8 percent; agricultural workers 72 percent;
and industrial producers and artisans 15.9 percent; while the 2005 mini-
census recorded 1.5 percent political cadres, 7.5 percent technicians, 4 per-
cent subordinate staff, 12 percent trade and service employees, 57 percent
farm workers and 17.8 percent producers. (13)
The current structure is evidently much more modern than in 1982. Nev-
ertheless it remains relatively archaic and close to the structures that pre-
vailed in Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan 40 or 50 years ago.
Increased insecurity
The improved job qualification, as highlighted by the distribution of
types of employment and the rise in educational levels, unfortunately
emerged alongside increased insecurity for working people. As emphasised
above, in the early 1980s, the “urban” workforce consisted of 99 percent of
the salaried class (zhigong) in the public and collective sectors enjoying an
“iron rice bowl,” or a basket of privileges including lifetime employment,
housing, medical coverage, and retirement at between 50 and 60 years of
age. It has also been seen above that the main innovation between 1985
and 1990 was the creation of a contract employee status with no firm
guarantee of employment for life. By the late 1990s, half of the 140 million
employees enjoying job protection had disappeared, with the number of
unemployed oscillating between 15 million and 20 million, of whom fewer
32 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o  2 0 1 1 / 2
12. 720.8 million minus 26 million unemployed.
13. It should be stressed that the different categories in 2005 had much higher education levels than in
1982, especially in terms of those with diplomas or higher technical education.
Special feature
Year Urban employment Public sector Collective sector Others New forms Rural employment Non-agricultural Total
2001 239.4 76 12.9 53.9 106.5 489.3 169 730.2
2002 247.8 71.6 11.2 73.9 91.1 490.8 169 737.4
2003 256.4 68.8 10 80.8 96.8 489.6 177.9 744.3
2004 264.8 67.1 9 97.8 90.9 487.9 179.5 752
2005 264.8 64.9 8.1 96.9 103.4 485 183.6 758.2
2006 283.1 64.3 7.6 112.6 106 480.1 194.6 764
2007 293.5 64.2 7.2 125.5 96.2 476.1 199.5 769.9
2008 302.1 64.5 6.6 135.9 95.1 472.7 203.6 774.8
Table 6 – Workforce changes 2001 to 2008 (in millions)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
than half received the dole. More recent annual statistical reports show
that the urban public and collective sectors employ no more than 71 mil-
lion, or less than a tenth of China’s workforce. Meanwhile, it should be
stressed that the size of the new, ill-defined job categories is growing
apace: it represented 95 million, or 12.2 percent of jobs, in 2008. A table
inserted into the 2005 mini-census publication showed that out of 231
million workers (115 million, that is to say nearly two thirds, of urban
workers, 52.9 million or nearly half of those in towns, and 58.7 million or
14 percent of workers in the countryside), just 20 percent enjoyed unem-
ployment insurance, a third had old age insurance, and 41 percent had
medical coverage. Moreover, among public sector employees, just 67 per-
cent enjoyed unemployment insurance, 83 percent had retirement bene-
fits, and 79 percent medical coverage. Of course, urban workers are rela-
tively better protected in terms of old age and health (40 percent), while
those in the countryside have to depend on their families. Add to this the
rapid increase in the number of the self-employed and the private sector,
whose employees are essentially dependent on insurance companies, as
well as the burgeoning ranks of the unemployed, only a minority of whom
receive any sort of allocations.
Growing inequalities
These changes exposed several weaknesses. The first is the relative
strength of the farming class. Even if China were approaching the juncture
where its potential working population would cease to grow after levelling
out at about a billion workers around 2015, it would have to absorb the
surplus farm labour estimated at a minimum of 100 million, and struggle
with rising inequalities between provinces. There is much talk now of three
Chinas: the industrialised coastal China; central China, where rural migrants
originate; and an underdeveloped western China. A comparison of agricul-
tural employment percentages in 1982 and 2008 suffices to understand
the seriousness of the situation. Of course, the proportion of farm jobs has
fallen in all provinces, but this reduction has varied greatly among regions.
It has been strongest in places and provinces close to the coast (Beijing,
Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guang-
dong), where more than 94 million secondary and tertiary jobs have been
created. But progress has been much weaker in the central provinces
(Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, and Guangxi), which
supply the vast majority of migrant workers. The total of secondary and
tertiary sector jobs has grown by just 42 million in these provinces com-
bined. Meanwhile, in the three northeastern provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, and
Heilongjiang), which were highly industrialised in 1982 with a little over
50 percent of non-agricultural jobs (20.4 million out of 40.6 million), just
5 million secondary and tertiary jobs have been created, and the propor-
tion of non-farm jobs has slid back to 44 percent. The rest, often referred
to as western China, but including northwestern and southwestern
provinces (Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang,
Tibet, Guizhou, and Yunnan), created a mere 15.5 million non-agricultural
jobs between 1982 and 2005. In 2005 these provinces had 28 percent of
their workforce in secondary and tertiary jobs as against a massive 72 per-
cent still bound to farming. 
The recently published 2010 census findings show that China’s popula-
tion growth has slowed, with just 75 million added in 10 years. Neverthe-
less, the difference between the workforce of expanding and declining gen-
erations will continue to have an impact for at least another decade: the
expanding generations to emerge between 2015 and 2020 will number
175 million and only then will begin to balance out the generations exiting
the workforce.
z Translated by N. Jayaram
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Agriculture Industry Services Total (in millions)
Annul report 1980 68.7 18.3 13 423
Annual report 1982 68.1 18.4 13.5 453
Census 1982 73.7 15.7 10.6 521
Annual report 1990 60.1 21.4 18.3 647.5
Census 1990 70.8 15 14.2 647.5
Annual report 2000 50 22.5 27.5 720.8
Census 2000 65 15 20 720
Annual report 2005 44.8 23.7 31.3 758.2
Study of 2005 59 17.5 23.5 714
Annual report 2008 39.6 27.2 33.2 774.2
Table 7 – Proportion of working population by sector of activity according to annual statistical reports and
census data (percentages)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
Year Cadres Technicians Lower-level staff Services Agriculturists Producers
1982 1.55 5.1 1.3 4 72 16
1990 1.7 5.3 1.75 5.4 70.5 15.1
2000 1.7 5.7 3.1 9.2 64 16.3
2005 1.5 7.5 4 12 57 17.8
Table 8 – Employment structure by type of activity (percentages)
Source: Annual Statistical Reports
